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Abstract
Modern machine learning models with very
high accuracy have been shown to be vul-
nerable to small, adversarially chosen per-
turbations of the input. Given black-box
access to a high-accuracy classifier f , we
show how to construct a new classifier g
that has high accuracy and is also robust to
adversarial ℓ2-bounded perturbations. Our
algorithm builds upon the framework of
randomized smoothing that has been re-
cently shown to outperform all previous de-
fenses against ℓ2-bounded adversaries. Us-
ing techniques like random partitions and
doubling dimension, we are able to bound
the adversarial error of g in terms of the op-
timum error. In this paper we focus on our
conceptual contribution, but we do present
two examples to illustrate our framework.
We will argue that, under some assump-
tions, our bounds are optimal for these
cases.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern neural networks achieve high accu-
racy on tasks such as image classification
(Krizhevsky et al. (2012)) or speech recogni-
tion (Collobert and Weston (2008)) but have been
shown to be susceptible to small, adversarially-
chosen perturbations of the inputs (Szegedy et al.
(2014), Nguyen et al. (2015), Biggio et al. (2013)):
given an input x, which is correctly classified by
a neural network, one is often able to find a small
perturbation δ such that x+δ is misclassified by the
neural network, whereas x and x + δ are virtually
indistinguishable to the human eye.
Many empirical approaches have been proposed for
building “robust” classifiers. One of the most suc-
cessful ones is the framework of adversarial train-
ing (Goodfellow et al. (2015), Kurakin et al. (2017),
Madry et al. (2017)). Unfortunately these tech-
niques usually protect only against restricted types
of adversaries. Moreover, many of the heuristic
defenses were shown to break in the presence of
suitably powerful adversaries (Carlini and Wagner
(2017), Athalye et al. (2018), Uesato et al. (2018)).
Certifiable robust classifiers, on the other hand,
are classifiers whose predictions are verifiably con-
stant within a neighborhood of a query point.
The first such classifiers were introduced by
Raghunathan et al. (2018) and Wong and Kolter
(2018). Randomized smoothing was considered in
(Le´cuyer et al. (2019), Li et al. (2018), Cohen et al.
(2019) and Salman et al. (2019)). This approach
works as follows.
Let f be any classifier which maps Rd to classes Y.
The smoothed classifier g classifies an input x as
that class c that is most likely to be returned by f
on input x+ δ, where δ ∼ N (0, σ2I).
It was shown in Le´cuyer et al. (2019) that this ap-
proach scales well and one can use it to train certifi-
ably robust classifier for ImageNet. In Cohen et al.
(2019) it is shown that for ℓ2 perturbations ran-
domized smoothing outperforms other certifiably de-
fenses previously proposed. Moreover the authors
show how to derive a robustness radius guarantee
for an input x. To derive the bound one defines for
a class c ∈ Y the probability pc := Pδ(f(x+ δ) = c),
where the perturbation δ is chosen according to
δ ∼ N (0, σ2I). Then one argues that if there exists
a c such that pc ≫ maxc′ 6=c pc′ then the robustness
radius at x is big. Unfortunately, even if the base
classifier f has very high accuracy we don’t know
much about the structure of {pc}c∈Y . Thus it’s hard
to reason about the robustness radii. These short-
comings point to the following question:
Having a black-box access to a high accuracy clas-
sifier f is it possible to construct a new classifier
g that is guaranteed to be both robust and has high
accuracy?
Note that robustness without an accuracy constraint
is trivially achieved by a constant classifier, and high
accuracy without a robustness constraints has also
been shown to be achievable in many settings of in-
terest. The real question of interest therefore only
appears if we require both types of constraints.
Our contributions: We show a framework for
transforming any high accuracy classifier f into
a provably robust and high accuracy classifier g.
Moreover we show what the optimal classifier for
a given learning task is and then relate the perfor-
mance of g to this optimum. We present two in-
stances of this framework. In order to keep the expo-
sition simple, we limit our setting to ℓ2-robustness.
The ideas apply more generally, but the details will
differ.
In the first instance we show that if f satisfies a
suitable property (similar to a property implicitly
assumed in Cohen et al. (2019) and Salman et al.
(2019)) then g can be evaluated with only black-box
access to f .
In the second instance we prove that, without any
assumptions on f , a robust classifier g can be evalu-
ated if besides f we also have access to an oracle O
that provides unlabeled i.i.d. samples from the un-
derlying distribution. Notice that this model is not
very restrictive. A similar setting occurs in semi-
supervised learning where the learner has access to
a dataset of labeled data Dl and also to (an often
much larger) dataset Du of unlabeled samples (see
Chapelle et al. (2010)). In this scenario Du serves
as the oracle O.
Even though our main contribution is a conceptual
one, we also present two implementations of these
methods that achieve different runtime/robustness
tradeoffs. In the end we give examples of binary
classification tasks (e.g. adversarial spheres from
Gilmer et al. (2018)) and compare the performance
of our methods on these tasks to the optimum.
2 OUR TECHNIQUES
Let us present an overview of our approach.
2.1 Randomized smoothing
Our techniques build upon randomized smooth-
ing from Le´cuyer et al. (2019), Li et al. (2018),
Cohen et al. (2019) and Salman et al. (2019). Con-
sider a classifier f that maps Rd to classes Y. Ran-
domized smoothing is a method that produces a new,
smoothed classifier g. The smoothed classifier g as-
signs to a query point x the class that is most likely
to be returned by f under random Gaussian noise
perturbations:
g(x) := argmax
c∈Y
P[f(x+ δ) = c], δ ∼ N (0, σ2I). (1)
Note that g can also be expressed as:
g(x) = argmax
c∈Y
∫
Rd
1{f(x)=c}γ(x− z)dz, (2)
where γ is the density function of N (0, σ2I).
Unfortunately it is easy to design a learning task
and a classifier f with low standard error such that
g, computed according to (1), has high error. For
instance, imagine the following binary classification
task in R2. We generate x ∈ R2 uniformly at random
from a union of two discsB−, B+ of radius 1 centered
at (−2, 0) and (2, 0), respectively. We assign the
label y = −1 if x belongs to B− and the label y = +1
otherwise. Let f(x) = −1 if x ∈ B− and f(x) = +1
otherwise (i.e., for all points x 6∈ B−). Observe that
f has a standard risk of 0. If we now compute g
according to (1), then g(x) = +1 for all x if σ ≥
1/(
√
2 InvErfc(12 )) ∼ 1.4826. This means that g has
an error of 12 .
The reason that we were able to construct such an
example is that in (1) the smoothing is performed
independent of the data. A natural idea to fix this is
to perform the smoothing “conditioned” on the data
distribution. For instance, in the example above we
would like to not take points outside B− ∪ B+ into
account during smoothing. The formal definition of
this approach is as follows:
g(x) := argmax
c∈Y
∫
Rd
1{f(x)=c}γ(x− z)pX(z)dz, (3)
where pX is the density function of the data distri-
bution. Notice the difference between (3) and (2).
Unfortunately we can construct “counter examples”
even for this modification as shown in the next sec-
tion.
2.2 Hard distribution for randomized
smoothing described in (3)
It is possible to create a separable, binary classifi-
cation task on Rd and a classifier f such that the
standard error of f is e−Θ(d) but the error of the
smoothed classifier g is Θ(1) (see Appendix A for
details). That is, the standard error grows by a fac-
tor eΘ(d) when we perform smoothing!
This example shows that when we use randomized
smoothing then already the standard error can grow
by a factor exponential in the dimension of the am-
bient space. As we aim for creating g that is ro-
bust and has small error we must try a different
approach.
2.3 Partitions
The intuitive reason why we were able to construct
the example in the previous section is that in ran-
domized smoothing it might happen that 1 misclas-
sified point of f contributes to eΘ(d) misclassified
points of g. To prevent that we use space partitions.
Assume that in a binary classification task the dis-
tance between the two classes is at least ǫ. Assume
further that we partition Rd into sets S1, S2, . . . ,
each of diameter at most ǫ. Now for x ∈ Rd we
define g(x) as the class that is most likely returned
by f on points sampled from the data distri-
bution conditioned on being in set Si to which
x belongs. As the classes are at least ǫ away from
each other and the diameters of the sets in the parti-
tion are at most ǫ, each misclassified point of f con-
tributes to at most 2 misclassified points of g (this
will be proven in Lemma 5). This means that the
error of g is bounded in terms of the error of f .
But we also want g to be robust. Intuitively we want
a big fraction of points to be far from the boundaries
of sets S1, S2, . . . . To do that we use padded random
partitions, which previously found applications in
low distortion embeddings (Gupta et al. (2003)), lo-
cality sensitive hashing (Andoni and Indyk (2008))
and even spectral algorithms (Lee et al. (2014)).
Definitions of random and padded partitions are pre-
sented in Section 5.
2.4 Doubling dimension
Some random partitions suffer from the big dimen-
sion of the space Rd. To improve the guarantees
for binary classification tasks that have data lying
on lower dimensional manifolds we resort to the no-
tion of doubling dimension (Section 4). This defini-
tion captures the intuition that it should be easier
to “describe” a manifold that is lower dimensional.
2.5 Examples
In Section 9 we give two examples to analyze the
tightness of the bounds obtained in Section 7. The
first one is a data distribution from Gilmer et al.
(2018). For this example we show that our approach
is competitive against a certain class of classifiers
(see Section 9.1 for an in-depth discussion). The
second example is a data distribution supported on
two low dimensional manifolds embedded in high-
dimensional space for which we show optimality of
our method up to constant factors.
3 PRELIMINARIES
For a distribution D over Rd and for a set A ⊆ Rd let
µ(A) := PX(X ∈ A). For us, D will denote the dis-
tribution of the data. For simplicity in this section
and the rest of the paper we consider only separable
binary classification tasks. Such tasks are fully spec-
ified by D as well as a ground truth h : Rd → {−1, 1}.
We note however that one can generalize the results
to any binary classification task (see Appendix B for
a generalization of the definitions from this section).
For x ∈ Rd and ǫ > 0 we write Bǫ(x) to denote the
open ball with center x and radius ǫ. Most of the
proofs are deferred to the Appendix D.
Definition 1. (Risk) Consider a binary classifica-
tion task for separable classes with a ground truth
h : Rd −→ {−1, 1}. For a classifier f : Rd −→ {−1, 1}
we define the Risk as
R(f) := PX(f(X) 6= h(X)).
Definition 2. (Adversarial Risk) Consider a bi-
nary classification task for separable classes with
a ground truth h : Rd −→ {−1, 1}. For a classi-
fier f : Rd −→ {−1, 1} and ǫ ∈ R≥0 we define the
Adversarial Risk as
AR(f, ǫ) := PX(∃ η ∈ Bǫ f(X + η) 6= h(X)).
We also introduce the notation:
AR(ǫ) := inf
f
AR(f, ǫ).
to denote the smallest achievable adversarial risk for
that classification task with a given ǫ.
Fact 1. (R versus AR)
• AR(f, 0) = R(f),
• AR(f, ǫ) and AR(ǫ) are nondecreasing func-
tions of ǫ; combined with the previous point
this in particular implies that for ǫ ∈ R≥0,
AR(f, ǫ) ≥ R(f),
• AR(f, ǫ)≤R(f)+PX∼D[f ¬ const. on Bǫ(X)].
Definition 3 (Separation function). For a bi-
nary classification task for separable classes with a
ground truth h : Rd −→ {−1, 1} we define a separa-
tion function as follows:
S(ǫ) := inf
E⊆Rd,d(M−\E,M+\E)≥ǫ
[PX(X ∈ E)] .
Here M− = h−1({−1}),M+ = h−1({1}). For a
given ǫ > 0 this function returns the probability
mass that needs to be removed so that the classes
are separated by an ǫ-margin.
Lemma 1. For all separable binary classification
tasks and all ǫ ∈ R≥0 we have that:
AR(ǫ) = S(2ǫ).
4 DOUBLING DIMENSION
Definition 4. (ǫ-Net) Let (M,d) be a metric space.
For N ⊆ M we say that N is an ǫ-net of M if it
satisfies:
• For every u,w ∈ N if u 6= w then d(u,w) ≥ ǫ,
• M ⊆ ⋃u∈N Bǫ(u).
Definition 5 (ǫ-Doubling dimension). For a
metric space (M,d), let λ be the smallest value such
that every ball of radius at most ǫ in M can be cov-
ered by λ balls of half the radius. We define the
ǫ-doubling dimension of M as dd((M,d), ǫ) :=
log2 λ. Sometimes we will omit specifying the met-
ric and write dd(M, ǫ) when the metric is clear from
the context.
Definition 6 (Doubling dimension). For a met-
ric space (M,d) it’s doubling dimension is defined
as:
dd((M,d)) := sup
ǫ>0
dd((M,d), ǫ)
Fact 2. dd((Rd, ℓ2)) ≤ 3d
The next fact was implicitly proven in Dasgupta
(2007).
Fact 3. Let M ⊆ Rd be a d′ dimensional manifold
such that the second fundamental form is uniformly
bounded by κ. Pick ǫ ≤ 1/2κ. If for all e′ ≤ ǫ, for
all x ∈M we have that Bǫ(x)∩M has at most 2O(d′)
connected components then
dd(M, ǫ) = O(d′),
where the metric on M is the inherited ℓ2 metric
from Rd.
Lemma 2. Let (M,d) be a metric space with ǫ-
doubling dimension dd. If all pairwise distances in
N ⊆M are at least r then for any point x ∈M and
radius r ≤ t ≤ ǫ we have |Bt(x) ∩N | ≤ 2dd⌈log 2tr ⌉.
Remark 1. In the remainder of the paper we will
only consider subsets of Rd and the metric we use is
always the inherited ℓ2 metric from the whole space.
5 RANDOM PARTITIONS
We now discuss random partitions, the main tech-
nical tool of the paper. For a metric space (M,d)
a partition π of M is as a function π : M −→ 2M ,
mapping a point x ∈M to the unique set π(x) in π
that contains x.
Although in this section we formulate all statements
with respect to a generic M , in the sequel it will be
important that M equals the support of the data
distribution, i.e., M = supp(D). In particular this
will come into play when the data lies on a manifold
of small dimension embedded in the ambient space.
To simplify our notation we will not repeat
this assertion in each subsequent statement.
For ǫ > 0 we say that π is ǫ-bounded if diam(π(x)) ≤
ǫ for all x ∈M . The main object of interest will be
random partitions. We denote a random partition
by Π and assume that it has distribution P . We say
that Π is ǫ-bounded if Π, drawn according to P , is
ǫ-bounded with probability 1.
Definition 7 (Padded partitions). For a metric
space (M,d) we say that a random partition Π ∼ P
is (ǫ, β, δ)-padded if it is ǫ-bounded and for every
x ∈M :
PΠ∼P [Bǫ/β(x) 6⊆ Π(x)] ≤ δ.
Corollary 1. Let Π ∼ P be an (ǫ, β, δ)-padded ran-
dom partition of a metric space (M,d). Then for
every distribution D we have that:
EΠ∼P [PX∼D[Bǫ/β(X) 6⊆ Π(X)]] ≤ δ.
Now let’s consider two random partitions:
Definition 8 (Cube partition). For the space
(Rd, ℓ2) and parameter ǫ we define a Cube parti-
tion as a partition of Rd into cubes of width ǫ/
√
d
corresponding to the shifted lattice v+ ǫ√
d
·Zd. Here
the shift v ∼ U([0, ǫ√
d
]d), i.e., v is drawn uniformly
at random from a fundamental region of the lattice
ǫ√
d
· Zd. A point x which lies in the intersection
of two or more cubes is assigned to the one that is
crossed first by a ray x+ α(1, 1, . . . , 1), α ∈ R≥0.
Definition 9 (Ball carving partition). For a
bounded M ⊆ Rd and ǫ > 0 we define a ball carving
partition as follows. Let N be an ǫ/4-net ofM . Pick
R uniformly at random from the interval (ǫ/4, ǫ/2].
Let σ be a random permutation of N . Then for each
u ∈ N define
Πˆ(u) := BR(u) \
⋃
w:σ(w)<σ(u)
BR(w).
Since the radius R can be strictly larger than some
pairwise distances it can happen that for some u ∈
N , Πˆ(u) does not contain u itself, leading to a po-
tential inconsistency in our notation for the points of
the net N . Hence, for all x ∈ M (and in particular
the points of the net N itself) let us define Π(x) to
be the unique Πˆ(w), w ∈ N , that contains x.
Lemma 3. Let Π be a Cube partition with parame-
ter ǫ. Then for every β > 2
√
d it is
(
ǫ, β, O(d
1.5)
β
)
-
padded.
The proof of the following Lemma is a slight modifi-
cation of a proof presented in (Gupta et al. (2003)).
Lemma 4. Let Π be a Ball carving partition of a
bounded M ⊆ Rd with parameter ǫ. Then for every
β > 1 it is (ǫ, β, O(dd(M,ǫ))β )-padded.
Proof. Recall that the net N underlying the ball
carving partition is an ǫ/4-net ofM . Fix a point x ∈
M and some t ∈ [0, ǫ/4]. Let W = Bǫ/2+t(x) ∩ N ,
and note that by Lemma 2 we have that m = |W | ≤
6dd(M,ǫ). Arrange the points w1, . . . , wn ∈ W in or-
der of increasing distance from x, and let Ik be the
interval [d(x,wk) − t, d(x,wk) + t]. Let us say that
Bt(x) is cut by a cluster Πˆ(wk) if Πˆ(wk)∩Bt(x) 6= ∅
and Bt(x) 6⊆ Πˆ(wk). Finally, write Ek for the event
that wk is the minimal element in W (according to
σ) for which Πˆ(wk) cuts Bt(x). Then,
P[Bt(x) is cut] ≤
m∑
k=1
P[Ek]
=
m∑
k=1
P[R ∈ Ik] · P[Ek|R ∈ Ik]
≤
m∑
k=1
4t
ǫ
· 1
k
≤ 4t
ǫ
(1 + lnm).
Using the fact that m = |W | ≤ 6dd(M,ǫ) we get that:
P[Bt(x) is cut] ≤ t · (8 · dd(M, ǫ) + 4)
ǫ
.
Corollary 2. If Π is a Ball carving partition of a
bounded M ⊆ Rd with parameter ǫ then for every
β > 1 it is
(
ǫ, β, O(d)β
)
-padded.
Proof. It’s a consequence of Fact 2 and Lemma 4.
6 FROM A PARTITION TO A
CLASSIFIER
To create a robust classifier g from a low-risk classi-
fier f we will use the following framework:
Algorithm 1 Smooth(f,P)
1: Partition “the space” using Π ∼ P
2: return g(x) := sgn(EZ∼D [f(Z)|Z ∈ Π(x)])
First we want to argue that if a partition π is ǫ-
bounded then g defined in Algorithm 1 will have
small Risk.
Lemma 5. Let π be an ǫ-bounded partition. For a
given f let g(x) = sgn(EZ∼D[f(Z)|Z ∈ π(x)]). Then
R(g) ≤ 2S(ǫ) + 2R(f).
The following lemma collects the results from pre-
vious sections to obtain a bound on the Adversarial
Risk of the classifier g in terms of the best possible
classifier.
Lemma 6. For all ǫ > 0 and any binary classifi-
cation task with underlying distribution D if there
exists an (ǫβ, β, δ)-padded random partition Π of
supp(D) then the following conditions hold. There
exists a randomized algorithm ALG that given black-
box access to classifier f produces a classifier g such
that in expectation over the random choices of ALG:
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S(ǫβ) + 2R(f) + δ
and if AR(ǫ) > 0 then:
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S(ǫβ)
S(2ǫ)
AR(ǫ) + 2R(f) + δ.
7 MAIN RESULTS
In this section we use the partitions defined in Sec-
tion 6 to derive explicit bounds for the Adversarial
Risk of the created classifier.
Theorem 1. Assume that Algorithm 1 uses Cube
partitions (see Definition 8). Let α > 0 and ǫ >
0. Then, in expectation over the randomness of the
algorithm,
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S
(
d
3
2 · ǫ
α
)
+ 2R(f) +O(α)
and if AR(ǫ) > 0 then
AR(g, ǫ) ≤
2S
(
d
3
2 ·ǫ
α
)
S(2ǫ)
AR(ǫ) + 2R(f) +O(α).
Proof. It is a consequence of Lemma 6 and Lemma 3.
To understand the interplay of the parameters
it’s instructive to consider the following case. If
S
(
O
(
d
3
2
)
α ǫ
)
and S(2ǫ) are comparable, say their
ratio is upper-bounded by a constant C, and α is
some small constant then the theorem says that the
classifier produced by the algorithm satisfies:
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2C ·AR(ǫ) + 2 · R(f) +O(1). (4)
That is, the produced classifier is at most 2C times
(plus additive error) worse than the optimal one.
Next we present an algorithm with a better bound
that uses Ball carving partitions.
Theorem 2. Assume that Algorithm 1 uses Ball
carving partitions (see Definition 9). Let α > 0 and
ǫ > 0. Then, in expectation over the randomness of
the algorithm,
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S
(
d · ǫ
α
)
+ 2R(f) +O(α)
and if AR(ǫ) > 0 then:
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S
(
d·ǫ
α
)
S(2ǫ)
AR(ǫ) + 2R(f) +O(α).
Proof. It is a consequence of Lemma 6 and Corol-
lary 2.
Finally we generalize Theorem 2 to the case when
the support of the underlying distribution is a low-
dimensional manifold.
Theorem 3. Assume that Algorithm 1 uses Ball
carving partitions (see Definition 9) and that
supp(D) ⊆ Rd is a d’ ≤ d dimensional manifold
such that the second fundamental form is uniformly
bounded by κ. Assume further that for all x ∈ M ,
and for all r ≤ 1/2κ the intersection Br(x)∩M has
at most 2O(d
′) connected components. Let α > 0 and
ǫ ≤ αO(d′)κ . Then, in expectation over the random-
ness of the algorithm,
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S
(
d’ · ǫ
α
)
+ 2R(f) +O(α)
and if AR(ǫ) > 0 then:
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S
(
d’·ǫ
α
)
S(2ǫ)
AR(ǫ) + 2R(f) +O(α).
Proof. It’s a consequence of Lemma 6, Lemma 4 and
Fact 3.
Note that all theorems in this section give bounds
in the expectation over the randomness of the al-
gorithms. By applying Markov inequality, we can
convert these bounds to bounds that are worse by a
factor γ > 1 but hold with probability 1− 1/γ.
8 COMPUTING sgn(E[f(Z)|Z∈pi(x)])
Recall that g(x) := sgn(EZ∼D[f(Z)|Z ∈ π(x)]). As
we do not know the distribution D we cannot com-
pute this expectation directly.
8.1 Scheme A: Approximation with oracle
One approach is to approximate the expectation by
a sample mean
gˆ(x) := sgn
(
1
s
s∑
i=1
f(Zi)
)
, (5)
where the Zi’s are i.i.d. samples from the distribu-
tion D conditioned on being inside π(x). To com-
pute this sum we need samples from D. Note that
unlabeled samples suffice.
We will bound the number of samples needed to es-
timate gˆ so that gˆ has small adversarial risk. Let
x ∈ Rd, and assume that |EZ∼D[f(Z)|Z∈π(x)]− 12 | ≥
0.1. If we use s samples to estimate gˆ(x) according
to (5), then, using standard tail bounds,
P[g(x) 6= gˆ(x)] ≤ e−Θ(s). (6)
Now assume that π has Q sets S1, S2, . . . , SQ. For
i ∈ {1, . . . , Q} let pi := PX∼D[X ∈ Si]. We only
need to worry about sets Si whose probability pi is
not too small. Hence, let H ⊆ {i ∈ {1, . . . , Q} :
pi ≥ R(f)Q }. We can argue now, as in the coupon
collector’s problem, that if we draw
O
(
Q
R(f)
log
(
Q
R(f)
)
+
Q log(Q)
R(f)
log log
(
Q
R(f)
))
(7)
samples from D then with constant probability, for
every i ∈ H at least Θ (log(Q)) samples will end up
in set Si.
Observe that sets not in H cover negligible mass of
D: ∑
i∈{1,...,Q}\H
pi ≤ R(f). (8)
Now let F := {i ∈ {1, . . . , Q} : |EZ∼D[f(Z)|Z ∈
Si] − 12 | ≤ 0.1} and notice that sets from F also
cover negligible mass of D:∑
i∈F
pi ≤ O(R(f)), (9)
because if i ∈ F then at least a 0.4 fraction of
points from Si is misclassified. Putting everything
together: by (6) and the union bound over Q sets,
if we sample (7) points from D then with constant
probability, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , Q} \ (F ∪ H) gˆ
is equal to g on Si, which by using (8), (9) and
Lemma 5 implies that R(gˆ) ≤ O(R(f) + S(ǫ)). As
a consequence, all theorems from Sections 7 remain
true in this setting up to some changes in the con-
stant factors. For instance a variant of Theorem 2
would state:
Theorem 4. Assume that we sample
O
(
Q
R(f)
log
(
Q
R(f)
)
+
Q log(Q)
R(f)
log log
(
Q
R(f)
))
points from D to estimate gˆ. Assume further that
Algorithm 1 uses Ball carving partitions (see Defini-
tion 9). Let α > 0 and ǫ > 0. Then, with constant
probability over the randomness of the algorithm,
AR(gˆ, ǫ) ≤ O
(
S
(
d · ǫ
α
)
+R(f) + α
)
and if AR(ǫ) > 0 then:
AR(gˆ, ǫ) ≤ O
(
S
(
d·ǫ
α
)
S(2ǫ)
AR(ǫ) +R(f) + α
)
.
8.2 Scheme B: Approximation by uniform
sampling
If Q is large then an alternative approach to esti-
mating g might be preferable. One might hope that
g(x) ≈ sgn(EZ∼U(π(x))[f(Z)]). (10)
In words, the expectation of f over the whole set
π(x) is a good proxy to the expectation of f with re-
spect to D conditioned on being in set π(x). If that
is the case then instead of performing the smoothing
with respect to the data distribution D we smooth
with respect to the uniform distribution on a set
of the partition. There are experimental results
that indicate that assumption (10) is reasonable.
In particular, the approach to approximate g(x) ac-
cording to (10) is similar to the smoothing used in
Cohen et al. (2019) and Salman et al. (2019) – in
these works the smoothing is performed by adding
a random Gaussian noise to the input. So also in
this case the smoothing does not depend on D. Au-
thors of these papers show that their methods out-
perform all previous defenses against ℓ2-norm adver-
sarial perturbations. This suggests that assumption
(10) holds.
A disadvantage of that approach is that it’s hard to
prove any theoretical guarantees for this algorithm
because, as we discussed before, classifiers with small
risk can still behave widely outside of supp(D). The
main advantage of this approach is that we don’t
require any additional data, apart from access to f ,
to compute gˆ. So if (10) holds then the theorems
from Section 7 give a direct, affirmative answer to
the question posed in the introduction.
The discussion about running times is deferred to
the Appendix C.
9 THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
In this section we will present two data distributions
and we will show how the implied guarantees from
Section 7 compare to the optimum.
9.1 Concentric spheres
First let’s analyze the concentric spheres dataset
considered in Gilmer et al. (2018). The data dis-
tribution consists of two concentric spheres in d di-
mensions: we generate x ∈ Rd where ||x||2 is either
1.0 or 1.3, with equal probability assigned to each
norm. We associate with each x a label y such that
y = −1 if ||x||2 = 1.0 and y = +1 otherwise.
First observe that the data is perfectly separable and
that the optimal classifier
gopt(x) =
{
−1, if ||x||2 ≤ 1.15
+1, otherwise
obtainsAR(gopt, 0.15) = 0, which is the information-
theoretic optimum. Assume that we have access to
a classifier f such that R(f) = δ. Now we want
to analyze the performance of our algorithm. More
precisely, we compare our algorithm to the set of
classifiers
H := {g : Rd −→ {−1, 1} | R(g) ≥ δ},
and not gopt. The constraint R(g) ≥ δ is natural
as it means that we want to be competitive against
classifiers that are no better than the input classifier
f .
Now assume that we want to produce a classifier
ALG(f) such that AR(ALG(f), ǫ) ≤ η, for some
η ∈ R+. We should compare the following two quan-
tities:
ǫalg := argmax
ǫ∈R+
[AR(ALG(f), ǫ) ≤ η], (11)
ǫopt := argmax
ǫ∈R+
[
min
g∈H
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ η
]
. (12)
Observe that the separation function for this dataset
is1
S(ǫ) =
{
0, if ǫ < 0.3,
1/2, otherwise.
Then Theorem 2 guarantees that we can produce
ALG(f) so that:
AR(ALG(f), ǫ) ≤ 2δ +O(ǫ · d).
Using definition (11) this gives us that ǫalg ≥
Θ(η−2δd ).
Now let g ∈ H. Recall that by definition R(g) ≥ δ.
Let Sin and Sout denote the inner and outer sphere,
respectively. Assume that E and E′ are the sets of
misclassified points on the inner and outer sphere
respectively. Without loss of generality we may as-
sume that µ(E) ≥ δ/2 (µ is the measure correspond-
ing to D). Notice that for all ǫ we have AR(g, ǫ) ≥
µ(E+Bǫ). Moreover, the isoperimetric inequality for
spheres states that among all sets of measure δ/2 the
one that minimizes µ(E + Bǫ) is a spherical cap of
this volume, see Gilmer et al. (2018). Let’s call this
cap C. Now observe that µ(C + Bǫ) ≈ δ2 (1 + ǫ)d.
This means that ǫopt ≤ O
(
log(δ/η)
d
)
.
Combining lower and upper bounds we get that:
ǫopt
ǫalg
≤ O
(
log(η/δ)
η − 2δ
)
. (13)
1The separating function S(ǫ) does not reach 1 for
large values of ǫ as one might think at first since one can
always completely remove one class in order to guarantee
a separation of ∞.
That is, our method achieves the target adversar-
ial risk but for perturbations that are O
(
log(η/δ)
η−2δ
)
smaller than the optimum. For example in a regime
where log(δ/η) remains smaller than a constant we
get a Markov-style tradeoff between the target ad-
versarial risk η and the optimality of ǫ.
It was shown in Gilmer et al. (2018) that neural net-
works trained on concentric spheres dataset achieve
very small risk. When one of the trained networks
was evaluated on 20 million samples no errors were
observed. This means that R(f) for the base classi-
fier f might be really small for this dataset. If for
the target adversarial risk we have η >> R(f) then
the bound (13) might not be satisfactory. It is an
interesting research direction to analyze the regime
where η >> R(f).
9.2 Intersecting circles
Let u1, u2 be a pair of orthonormal vectors in
R
d. Let C−1, C+1 ⊆ Rd be two circles in the 2-
dimensional subspace spanned by u1, u2 of radius 1
centered at 0 and u1 respectively. The data dis-
tribution is defined as follows: we generate x ∼
U(C−1 ∪ C+1) and we associate with each x a la-
bel y such that y = −1 if x ∈ C−1 and y = +1
otherwise.
Note that for ǫ ≤ 1/10, S(ǫ) = Θ(ǫ). This is
true since in order to ǫ-separate the classes we need
to remove the points close to the two intersection
points. Note that supp(D) is a union of two 1-
dimensional manifolds whose second fundamental
form is bounded by Θ(1) (Theorem 3 also works in
this case). Hence, using Theorem 3 for all ǫ < 1/10
and α > 0:
AR(g, αǫ) ≤ O(AR(ǫ) +R(f) + α).
This means that if α is a small constant and R(f)
is small then g is only a constant times (plus an
additive error) worse than the optimal classifier for
adversarial perturbations which are only α times
smaller. Note that the final guarantee does not de-
pend on the dimension of the ambient space but only
on the dimension of the manifolds themselves, which
in this case is 1.
10 OPEN PROBLEMS &
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
One important open problem is to consider improve-
ments of Theorem 2. In this theorem the guaranteed
robustness radius degrades with the dimensionality
d of the space. One might hope to get a better de-
pendence on d. In some regimes however it might
be hard to achieve an improvement as discussed in
Subsection 9.1 (see competitive guarantee (13)).
It is also interesting to analyze different threat mod-
els. Imagine that we want the classifier to be robust
against an oblivious adversary, that is an adver-
sary that has access to f and the algorithm’s code
but does not know the randomness used by the al-
gorithm. In Appendix E we show that in this model
it’s possible to achieve the bound
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S
(√
d · ǫ
α
)
+ 2R(f) +O(α).
Note that the main difference compared to Theo-
rem 2 is that we have the factor
√
d instead of d.
Intuitively this means that we are be able to get the
same adversarial risk for perturbations that are
√
d
bigger.
Another research direction is to improve the running
time of the algorithms so they become more practi-
cal, especially the ones using Ball carving partition.
These methods suffer from the high dimension of
the ambient space Rd, but as discussed in Subsec-
tion C.0.2 there might be hope to improve the run-
time per query to 2O(dd(supp(D),ǫ)). This would be
a significant improvement for low-dimensional data
distributions.
Finally we can look at randomized smoothing and
the algorithm presented in this paper as two ends of
a spectrum. The former is fast but doesn’t guaran-
tee good adversarial risk. The latter is slower but
produces a robust classifier. One might hope to find
a smooth tradeoff between the runtime and the ad-
versarial risk guarantee.
References
Andoni, A. and Indyk, P. (2008). Near-optimal hash-
ing algorithms for approximate nearest neighbor
in high dimensions. Commun. ACM, 51(1):117–
122.
Athalye, A., Carlini, N., and Wagner, D. A. (2018).
Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of secu-
rity: Circumventing defenses to adversarial ex-
amples. In Proceedings of the 35th International
Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2018,
Stockholmsma¨ssan, Stockholm, Sweden, July 10-
15, 2018, pages 274–283.
Biggio, B., Corona, I., Maiorca, D., Nelson, B.,
Sˇrndic´, N., Laskov, P., Giacinto, G., and Roli, F.
(2013). Evasion attacks against machine learning
at test time. In Blockeel, H., Kersting, K., Ni-
jssen, S., and Zˇelezny´, F., editors,Machine Learn-
ing and Knowledge Discovery in Databases, pages
387–402, Berlin, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg.
Blum, A., Hopcroft, J., and Kannan, R. (2015).
Foundations of data science.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. A. (2017). Adversar-
ial examples are not easily detected: Bypassing
ten detection methods. In Proceedings of the
10th ACMWorkshop on Artificial Intelligence and
Security, AISec@CCS 2017, Dallas, TX, USA,
November 3, 2017, pages 3–14.
Chapelle, O., Schlkopf, B., and Zien, A. (2010).
Semi-Supervised Learning. The MIT Press, 1st
edition.
Charikar, M., Chekuri, C., Goel, A., Guha, S., and
Plotkin, S. (1998). Approximating a finite metric
by a small number of tree metrics. In Proceedings
of the 39th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, FOCS ’98, pages 379–, Wash-
ington, DC, USA. IEEE Computer Society.
Cohen, J., Rosenfeld, E., and Kolter, Z. (2019).
Certified adversarial robustness via randomized
smoothing. In Chaudhuri, K. and Salakhutdinov,
R., editors, Proceedings of the 36th International
Conference on Machine Learning, volume 97 of
Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages
1310–1320, Long Beach, California, USA. PMLR.
Collobert, R. and Weston, J. (2008). A unified ar-
chitecture for natural language processing: Deep
neural networks with multitask learning. In Pro-
ceedings of the 25th International Conference on
Machine Learning, ICML ’08, pages 160–167, New
York, NY, USA. ACM.
Dasgupta, S. (2007). Random projection trees and
low dimensional manifolds. Technical report.
Dyer, M., Frieze, A., and Kannan, R. (1991). A
random polynomial-time algorithm for approxi-
mating the volume of convex bodies. J. ACM,
38(1):1–17.
Gilmer, J., Metz, L., Faghri, F., Schoenholz, S. S.,
Raghu, M., Wattenberg, M., and Goodfellow, I. J.
(2018). Adversarial spheres. In 6th International
Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR
2018, Vancouver, BC, Canada, April 30 - May
3, 2018, Workshop Track Proceedings.
Gionis, A., Indyk, P., and Motwani, R. (1999). Sim-
ilarity search in high dimensions via hashing. In
Proceedings of the 25th International Conference
on Very Large Data Bases, VLDB ’99, pages 518–
529, San Francisco, CA, USA. Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers Inc.
Goodfellow, I., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. (2015).
Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples.
In International Conference on Learning Repre-
sentations.
Gupta, A., Krauthgamer, R., and Lee, J. R. (2003).
Bounded geometries, fractals, and low-distortion
embeddings. In 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceed-
ings., pages 534–543.
Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., and Hinton, G. E.
(2012). Imagenet classification with deep convo-
lutional neural networks. In Pereira, F., Burges,
C. J. C., Bottou, L., and Weinberger, K. Q., ed-
itors, Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems 25, pages 1097–1105. Curran Associates,
Inc.
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. J., and Bengio, S.
(2017). Adversarial machine learning at scale.
Le´cuyer, M., Atlidakis, V., Geambasu, R., Hsu, D.,
and Jana, S. (2019). Certified robustness to ad-
versarial examples with differential privacy. In
2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 19-23,
2019, pages 656–672.
Lee, J. R., Gharan, S. O., and Trevisan, L.
(2014). Multiway spectral partitioning and higher-
order cheeger inequalities. Journal of the ACM
(JACM), 61(6):37.
Li, B., Chen, C., Wang, W., and Carin, L. (2018).
Second-order adversarial attack and certifiable ro-
bustness. CoRR, abs/1809.03113.
Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D.,
and Vladu, A. (2017). Towards deep learning
models resistant to adversarial attacks. ArXiv,
abs/1706.06083.
Nguyen, A. M., Yosinski, J., and Clune, J. (2015).
Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High con-
fidence predictions for unrecognizable images. In
CVPR, pages 427–436. IEEE Computer Society.
Raghunathan, A., Steinhardt, J., and Liang, P.
(2018). Certified defenses against adversarial ex-
amples. In 6th International Conference on Learn-
ing Representations, ICLR 2018, Vancouver, BC,
Canada, April 30 - May 3, 2018, Conference
Track Proceedings.
Salman, H., Yang, G., Li, J., Zhang, P., Zhang, H.,
Razenshteyn, I. P., and Bubeck, S. (2019). Prov-
ably robust deep learning via adversarially trained
smoothed classifiers. ArXiv, abs/1906.04584.
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J.,
Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus, R. (2014).
Intriguing properties of neural networks. In Inter-
national Conference on Learning Representations.
Uesato, J., O’Donoghue, B., Kohli, P., and van den
Oord, A. (2018). Adversarial risk and the dangers
of evaluating against weak attacks. In Proceedings
of the 35th International Conference on Machine
Learning, ICML 2018, Stockholmsma¨ssan, Stock-
holm, Sweden, July 10-15, 2018, pages 5032–5041.
Wong, E. and Kolter, J. Z. (2018). Provable de-
fenses against adversarial examples via the convex
outer adversarial polytope. In Proceedings of the
35th International Conference on Machine Learn-
ing, ICML 2018, Stockholmsma¨ssan, Stockholm,
Sweden, July 10-15, 2018, pages 5283–5292.
A Hard distribution for randomized
smoothing described in (3)
Consider the following data distribution. For ǫ that
will be fixed later, let Sǫ(0) ⊆ Rd be a sphere of
radius ǫ around 0 and N ⊆ Sǫ(0) be a set of car-
dinality e0.118d such that for all x, y ∈ N, x 6= y we
have ||x− y||2 ≥ 1.2ǫ. One can show that such a set
exists using bounds for the surface area of spherical
caps in high dimension (see Blum et al. (2015)).
Let the binary classification task be as follows. Let
the distribution D+1 for class +1 be such that
supp(D+1) = (N ∪ {0}) + B0.01ǫ (where the + de-
notes the Minkowski sum). The density function
on B0.01ǫ(0) is e
0.108d times larger than the one on
B0.01ǫ(u) for every u ∈ N . Now let D−1 be such that
supp(D−1)∩supp(D+1) = ∅ and each class has prob-
ability 1/2. Now assume that the points that clas-
sifier f misclassifies are exactly points in B0.01ǫ(0).
Then the standard error of f is at most e−0.01d. Now
let ǫ :=
√
(dσ)/10. One can verify that when g is
computed according to (1) then for all x ∈ N+B0.01ǫ
we have g(x) = −1, which means that g misclassifies
all points from N +B0.01ǫ. So the standard error of
g is at least 25%. This means that the error of g is
eΘ(d) times larger than the error of f !
Remark 2. One might argue that this example was
crafted artificially and that in the “real world” we
can choose σ depending on the data. However it is
possible to construct examples such that for any rea-
sonable choice of σ a dynamic similar to the one
presented above occurs. The idea is to put a collec-
tion of the above configurations at different scales
and far from each other.
B Generalization of definitions to
nonseparable learning tasks
Definition 2a. For a binary classification task and
a classifier f : Rd −→ {−1, 1} we define Risk as
R(f) :=
∫
pX(x)
∑
y∈{−1,1}
PY |X(y|x)1{f(x)=y}dx.
Definition 3a. For a binary classification task, a
classifier f : Rd −→ {−1, 1}, and ǫ ≥ 0 we define
Adversarial Risk as
AR(f, ǫ) :=
∫
pX(x)g(f, x, ǫ)dx,
where
g(f, x, ǫ) :=

PY |X(−1 | x), Bǫ(x) ⊆M1(f),
PY |X(1 | x), Bǫ(x) ⊆M−1(f),
1, otherwise,
where My = f
−1({y}), y ∈ {−1, 1}. We also intro-
duce the notation:
AR(ǫ) := inf
f
AR(f, ǫ),
to denote the optimal classification error for that
classification task with a given ǫ.
Note that this definition assumes that the adversary,
apart from x, has also access to the label y. In other
words, we prove bounds with respect to a strong
adversary.
Definition 4a (Separation function). For a bi-
nary classification task we define the separation
function S(ǫ) as follows:
S(ǫ) := inf
E−1,E1⊆Rd
d(Rd\E−1,Rd\E1)≥ǫ
∑
y∈{−1,1}
∫
x∈Ey
pX(x)PY |X(y | x)dx.
For a given ǫ > 0 this function returns the minimum
probability mass that needs to be removed so that
the classes are separated by an ǫ-margin.
Lemma 7. For all binary classification tasks and
all ǫ ≥ 0 we have that:
AR(ǫ) = S(2ǫ).
Proof. First we prove that AR(ǫ) ≤ S(2ǫ). Let E−1
and E1 be the minimizer sets from the definition of
S(2ǫ). Let f(x) := −1 if d(x,Rd \ E−1) ≤ ǫ and
f(x) := 1 otherwise. Then observe that for all x ∈
(Rd\E−1), Bǫ(x) ⊆M−1(f) and for all x ∈ (Rd\E1),
Bǫ(x) ⊆M1(f). Hence AR(ǫ) ≤ S(2ǫ).
Now we prove that AR(ǫ) ≥ S(2ǫ). Let f be a clas-
sifier with AR(f, ǫ) = r. Let E−1 be the set of all
points x ∈ Rd so that Bǫ(x) 6⊆M−1(f) and let E1 be
the set of all points x ∈ Rd so that Bǫ(x) 6⊆ M1(f).
It follows that
d(Rd \ E−1,Rd \ E1) ≥ 2ǫ. (14)
But now note that for this choice of sets E−1 and
E1,∑
y∈{−1,1}
∫
x∈Ey
pX(x)PY |X(y | x)dx = r = AR(f, ǫ).
Hence, for S(2ǫ), being defined as the infimum over
all choices of sets E−1 and E1 which fulfill (14), we
have S(2ǫ) ≤ r = AR(f, ǫ).
C Running time discussion
Let us now analyze the running times of Algorithm 1
as a function of the used partition as well as the
method of estimating g. In the stated bounds we
will assume that each evaluation of f takes time t.
C.0.1 Cube partition
Scheme B: First let’s analyze the performance of
Cube partitions together with assumption (10). To
evaluate gˆ(x) we need to locate a cube to which x
belongs to and smooth f over that cube. Smoothing
is approximated by a sample mean and as argued
before O(log(Q)) samples suffice. So in the end the
running time per query is O(t · log(Q)). If we store
(using hashing techniques) previous function evalu-
ations then the query time drops to O(1) for queries
from cubes that were already queried before.
Scheme A: If we use (5) instead of (10) then we first
perform a preprocessing step in which we sample a
set U of unlabeled samples of size (7). Then using
standard hashing techniques we can create a data
structure of size (7) that for a point x ∈ Rd will
provide access to U ∩π(x) in O(1) time per accessed
element. Having that query time is O(t · log(Q))
because, as argued before, for each cube it’s enough
to consider only that many samples to compute a
good estimator. Similarly as in the previous case for
repeated queries time drops to O(1).
C.0.2 Ball carving partition
Scheme B: Now let’s analyze Ball carving parti-
tions with assumption (10). The situation here is
much more complicated and the implementation is
much more involved. To compute g we need access
to an ǫ/4-net N that covers supp(D). We create N
on the fly. I.e., we start with N = ∅ and when a
query q ∈ supp(D) arrives then if q 6∈ ⋃u∈N Bǫ/4(u)
we add q to N . Whenever we add a vertex to N
we sample a new permutation σ on N , which corre-
sponds to a new partition. This means that when a
point is added to N then g can change. But once
the construction process stabilizes then g remains
fixed. Using Chebyshev’s inequality one can verify
that if for O(1/R(f)) consecutive queries we don’t
add new vertices to N then
⋃
u∈N Bǫ/4(u) contains
1 − O(R(f)) probability mass of D with probabil-
ity 1 − R(f). When this event occurs we can stop
changing N as the probability mass not covered by
N is O(R(f)) with high probability. Finally observe
that:
|N | ≤ max
N′⊆supp(D):
N ′ is ǫ/4−net
|N ′|
≤ min
N′⊆supp(D):
N ′eq is ǫ/8−net
|N ′| =: Qmax.
Now let’s analyze the running time. Consider a
query q ∈ Rd. To compute g(q) we must first check
if q should be added to N and this can be done in
O(|N |) time. Then we choose a random permuta-
tion and locate the set π(q) to which q belongs (also
in O(|N |) time).
After locating u ∈ N such that q ∈ BR(u) \⋃
w:σ(w)<σ(u)BR(w) = π(q) we need to sample
points uniformly at random from π(q) to compute
sample mean to estimate g(q). One way to do that
is to use Hit-and-Run sampling. To generate a uni-
formly random point from π(q) we generate a se-
quence {xi} ⊆ π(q) according to the following rule:
• x0 = q,
• to generate xi+1 from xi we first pick a random
direction v. We find minimal and maximal val-
ues such that xi + θ · v ∈ π(q). We pick θ∗
uniformly from the interval [θmin, θmax] and we
set xi+1 := xi + θ
∗ · v.
After generating some number of points we declare
the last point as a point drawn from U(π(q)). The
time needed to generate one sample is k · O(|N |),
where k is the number of iterations we perform.
To get an algorithm with a theoretical guarantee on
the running time for sampling points one can re-
sort to an algorithm from Dyer et al. (1991). That
algorithm implicitly, in polynomial in d time, sam-
ples a point uniformly at random from a convex
body. It is possible to adapt the algorithm to
the case of non-convex bodies (as our set π(q) is
not necessarily convex). We can think that π(q)
is ”close” to being convex as it is defined by a
carving process with balls of equal radii. Recall
from previous discussion that it’s enough to have
O(log(Q)) samples per set. So in the end if we use
this algorithm then the running time for computing
g(p) will be O (poly(d) · log(Q) · |N |+ t log(Q)) =
O (poly(d) ·Qmax log(Qmax) + t log(Qmax)).
Scheme A: If we use (5) instead of (10) then we
first perform a preprocessing step in which we sam-
ple a set U of unlabeled samples of size (7) (with
Q set to Qmax). Then we use a greedy algorithm
to find a maximal subset N ⊆ U such that for ev-
ery u,w ∈ N, u 6= w we have ||u−w||2 ≥ ǫ/4. Using
Chebyshev’s inequality one can argue that with high
probability
⋃
u∈N Bǫ/4(u) contains 1−O(R(f)) mass
of D. We then perform the ball carving partition us-
ingN . Then in time O˜(Q2max) we create a data struc-
ture of size (7) that for a point u ∈ N will provide
access to U ∩ (BR(u) \
⋃
w:σ(w)<σ(u)BR(w)) in O(1)
time per accessed element. Then for a query q we
need to first locate u ∈ N such that q ∈ π(u), which
takes O(Qmax) time and then we compute sample
mean in O(t · log(Qmax)) time. So in the end the
running time per query is O(t · log(Qmax)). If there
is a repeated query for the same set then we can
answer it in O(Qmax) time.
The O(Qmax) factor in both approaches is far from
perfect. However there might be hope to decreasing
this factor to 2O(dd(supp(M),ǫ)) using locality sensitive
hashing techniques (Gionis et al. (1999)) as in prin-
ciple we only need to check points in the neighbor-
hood of q to determine π(q) and in this neighborhood
we have only 2O(dd(supp(M),ǫ)) of them. It might also
be possible to reduce the running time further which
might be an interesting research direction.
Remark 3. Assume that the data is supported on
a lower dimensional manifold of dimension d′ and
satisfies the assumptions from Theorem 3. Then ro-
bustness guarantees of our algorithms improve auto-
matically with d′. That is we don’t need to provide
d′ as the input to our algorithms.
D Omitted proofs
D.1 Proofs of Section 3
Lemma 1. For all separable binary classification
tasks and all ǫ ∈ R≥0 we have that:
AR(ǫ) = S(2ǫ).
Proof. First we prove that AR(ǫ) ≤ S(2ǫ). Let E
be the minimizer set from the definition of S(2ǫ).
Let f(x) := −1 if d(x,M− \ E) ≤ ǫ and f(x) := +1
otherwise. Then observe that for all x ∈ (M− \
E) ∪ (M+ \ E) there does not exist an η so that
f(x+ η) 6= h(x). Hence AR(ǫ) ≤ S(2ǫ).
Now we prove that AR(ǫ) ≥ S(2ǫ). Let f be a classi-
fier with AR(f, ǫ) = r. That means that there exists
A ⊆ Rd such that
• PX(X ∈ A) ≥ 1− r,
• for all x ∈ A we have ∀ η ∈ Bǫ f(x+ η) = h(x).
This means that Rd \ A is a 2ǫ-separator for that
binary task, so in turn S(2ǫ) ≤ r = AR(f, ǫ).
D.2 Proofs of Section 4
Fact 2. dd((Rd, ℓ2)) ≤ 3d
Proof. Let Bǫ(0) ⊆ Rd be a ball of radius ǫ for some
ǫ > 0. Let N be an ǫ/2-net of Bǫ(0). Notice that
all balls in {Bǫ/4(u) : u ∈ N} are pairwise disjoint
and that
⋃
u∈N Bǫ/4(u) ⊆ B5ǫ/4(0). Hence |N | ≤
vol(B5ǫ/4)
vol(Be/4)
= 5d.
Lemma 2. Let (M,d) be a metric space with ǫ-
doubling dimension dd. If all pairwise distances in
N ⊆M are at least r then for any point x ∈M and
radius r ≤ t ≤ ǫ we have |Bt(x) ∩N | ≤ 2dd⌈log 2tr ⌉.
Proof. As t ≤ ǫ we can use the definition of ǫ-
doubling dimension and get that Bt(x) can be cov-
ered with 2dd balls of radius t/2. Iterating that ar-
gument, we conclude that Bt(x) can be covered by
2dd⌈log
2t
r ⌉ balls of radius r/2. But every such ball can
contain at most one point from N so |Bt(x) ∩N | is
also upper bounded by 2dd⌈log
2t
r ⌉.
D.3 Proofs of Section 5
Corollary 1. Let Π ∼ P be an (ǫ, β, δ)-padded ran-
dom partition of a metric space (M,d). Then for
every distribution D we have that:
EΠ∼P [PX∼D[Bǫ/β(X) 6⊆ Π(X)]] ≤ δ.
Proof.
EΠ∼P [PX∼D[Bǫ/β(X) 6⊆ Π(X)]]
= EΠ∼P [EX∼D[1{Bǫ/β(X) 6⊆Π(X)}]]
= EX∼D[EΠ∼P [1{Bǫ/β(X) 6⊆Π(X)}]]
= EX∼D
[
PΠ∼P [Bǫ/β(X) 6⊆ Π(X)]
] ≤ δ.
Lemma 3. Let Π be a Cube partition with parame-
ter ǫ. Then for every β > 2
√
d it is
(
ǫ, β, O(d
1.5)
β
)
-
padded.
Proof. For all x ∈ Rd, diam(Π(x)) = ǫ by construc-
tion. Let A =
[
0, ǫ√
d
]d
. This is the set of all points
of one fundamental cube. Let G =
[
ǫ
β ,
ǫ√
d
− ǫβ
]d
and note that d
(
G,Rd \A) = ǫβ . G represents the
set of all good points inside A, in the sense that if we
center a sphere of radius ǫ/β at one of those points
the whole sphere stays contained inside A. Now ob-
serve that
vol(G)
vol (A)
=
(
1− 2
√
d
β
)d
≥ 1− 2 · d
1.5
β
. (15)
Let v be the shift that generates the partition π.
Consider the set I(v) :=
⋃
z∈v+ ǫ√
d
·Zd(G+ z). Using
(15), we conclude by noting that for every x ∈ Rd
PΠ∼P [B ǫ
β
(x) 6⊆ Π(x)] ≤ PV∼U(A)[x 6∈ I(V )] ≤ 2d
3
2
β
.
D.4 Proofs of Section 6
Lemma 5. Let π be an ǫ-bounded partition. For a
given f let g(x) = sgn(EZ∼D[f(Z)|Z ∈ π(x)]). Then
R(g) ≤ 2S(ǫ) + 2R(f).
Proof. Let us first prove the weaker bound R(g) ≤
3S(ǫ) + 2R(f). Let E be the minimizer set from
the definition of S(ǫ) and M− = h−1({−1}),M+ =
h−1({1}). Then we know that d(M−\E,M+\E) ≥ ǫ
and PX∼D(X ∈ E) ≤ S(ǫ). Let Q ⊆ M− ∪M+ be
the set of missclassified points of f in M− ∪ M+.
Observe that
R(g) ≤ S(ǫ) +
∑
u∈N,Πˆ(u)∩M− 6=∅,g(Πˆ(u))=+1
µ(Πˆ(u))
+
∑
u∈N,Πˆ(u)∩M+ 6=∅,g(Πˆ(u))=−1
µ(Πˆ(u))
≤ S(ǫ) +
∑
u∈N,Πˆ(u)∩M−6=∅,
g(Πˆ(u))=+1
2µ(Πˆ(u) ∩ (Q ∪ E))
+
∑
u∈N,Πˆ(u)∩M+ 6=∅,
g(Πˆ(u))=−1
2µ(Πˆ(u) ∩ (Q ∪ E))
≤ S(ǫ) + 2(µ(Q) + µ(E))
≤ 3S(ǫ) + 2R(f).
To see that the claimed stronger bound is valid note
the following. Every point in E will appear either in
exactly one of the two sums or it will be counted by
the term S(E). In the first two cases it is weighted
by a factor 2 and in the second case it is weighted by
a factor 1. This gives rise to the term 3S(E). But
no point of E appears in both of those cases. We
can therefore tighten this term to 2S(E).
Lemma 6. For all ǫ > 0 and any binary classifi-
cation task with underlying distribution D if there
exists an (ǫβ, β, δ)-padded random partition Π of
supp(D) then the following conditions hold. There
exists a randomized algorithm ALG that given black-
box access to classifier f produces a classifier g such
that in expectation over the random choices of ALG:
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S(ǫβ) + 2R(f) + δ
and if AR(ǫ) > 0 then:
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S(ǫβ)
S(2ǫ)
AR(ǫ) + 2R(f) + δ.
Proof. We will prove that Algorithm 1 invoked with
f and Π ∼ P satisfies the statement of the Lemma.
By Fact 1
AR(g, ǫ)≤R(g)+PX∼D[g ¬ constant on Bǫ(X)].
(16)
By Lemma 5 we have:
R(g) ≤ 2S(ǫβ) + 2R(f). (17)
Moreover, by Corollary 1 we have that:
EΠ∼P [PX∼D[Bǫ(X) 6⊆ Π(X)]] ≤ δ. (18)
But we also know from the definition of g that
PX∼D[g is not constant on Bǫ(X)] ≤
PX∼D[Bǫ(X) 6⊆ Π(X)]. (19)
Combining (16),(17),(18) and (19) we get that in ex-
pectation over the random choices of the algorithm
AR(g, ǫ) ≤ 2S(ǫβ) + 2R(f) + δ
=
2S(ǫβ)
S(2ǫ)
AR(ǫ) + 2R(f) + δ,
where in the last equality we used Lemma 1. Note
that the last inequality is only valid if AR(ǫ) > 0.
E Oblivious adversary
Let’s consider the model where the adversary has
full knowledge of the base classifier f and the code
of the algorithm ALG that produces g but doesn’t
have access to random bits used by ALG. Then the
following is true:
Theorem 5. For every separable binary classifica-
tion task in Rd and for every ǫ ∈ R+ there exists
a randomized algorithm ALG that, given black-box
access to f : Rd −→ {−1, 1}, provides query access to
a function g : Rd −→ {−1, 1} such that:
• R(g) ≤ 2S(ǫ) + 2R(f),
• For every x, x′ ∈ Rd we have that:
PALG[g(x) 6= g(x′)] ≤ O
(
‖x− x′‖2 ·
√
d
ǫ
)
.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is an adaptation
of a random partition technique from Charikar et al.
(1998). This paper presents an algorithm that cre-
ates a random partition that is (ǫ, O(
√
d))−Lipshitz
(a notion similar to padded partitions), that is a
random partition that is ǫ-bounded and for every
x, x′ ∈ Rd:
P[Π(x) 6= Π(x′)] ≤ O
(
‖x− x′‖2 ·
√
d
ǫ
)
.
Using this partition ALG creates g using the frame-
work from Algorithm 1. One can verify that this g
satisfies the statements of the theorem.
Remark 4. We note that the Algorithm from
Charikar et al. (1998) is very similar to the ran-
dom partition from Definition 9 as it also performs
a version of ball carving. Based on this similarity,
it is tempting to conjecture that the ball carving par-
tition from Definition 9 is
(
ǫ, O(
√
d)
)
− Lipshitz
also. We leave this as an interesting open ques-
tion. Moreover, we note that the Algorithm from
Charikar et al. (1998) can be easily adapted to any
ℓp norm achieving
(
ǫ, O(d1/2p)
)−Lipshitz partition
for 1 ≤ p ≤ 2 and (ǫ, O(d1−1/p))−Lipshitz partition
for p > 2. This means that using this technique one
can get adversarial robustness guarantees for any ℓp
norm for p ≥ 1.
Now observe that Theorem 5 gives us an algorithmA
that is robust against any oblivious adversary. The
algorithm works as follows: for a series of queries
x′1, x
′
2, · · · ∈ Rd (x′i’s are inputs crafted by the adver-
sary), for every i, A using ALG from Theorem 5, re-
computes a new gi to answer query x
′
i. We know that
R(gi) ≤ 2S(ǫ) + 2R(f) and moreover for every x, x′
we have PALG[gi(x) 6= gi(x′)] ≤ O
(
‖x−x′‖2·
√
d
ǫ
)
.
This means that no matter what the strategy of
the adversary is (this strategy might depend on
g1(x
′
1), . . . , gi−1(x′i−1)) the probability that the ad-
versary will be able to construct two points such that
‖xi − x′i‖2 ≤ t and gi(xi) 6= gi(x′i) is upper bounded
by O
(
t·√d
ǫ
)
.
We summarize: For every i, if Xi ∼ D at the i-th
step and the adversary creates X ′i such that ‖Xi −
X ′i‖2 ≤ ǫ then for every α:
PXi,A(gi(X
′
i) 6= h(Xi)) ≤
2S
(√
d · ǫ
α
)
+ 2R(f) +O(α).
Observe the connection to Definition 2 which we re-
state here for convenience:
AR(f, ǫ) := PX(∃ η ∈ Bǫ f(X + η) 6= h(X)).
The reason that we were able to gain a factor
√
d in
comparison to Theorem 2 is that we didn’t need to
ensure that a function is constant on a ball B(x, ǫ).
It was enough to show that it is constant for every
fixed pair of nearby points as the adversary can only
test one point at a time.
This gain comes at a cost as we need to recom-
pute the partition after every query. If one recom-
putes the partition every k queries then by the union
bound the guarantee changes to:
PXi,A(gi(X
′
i) 6= h(Xi)) ≤
2S
(√
d · k · ǫ
α
)
+ 2R(f) +O(α).
